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BOOK REVIEWS

THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947, by D. M. Giangreco. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 584 pages. $35.

Since August 1945, historians have
debated President Harry S. Truman’s
controversial decision to use the atom
bomb—a catastrophic new military
technology—to force Japan’s Emperor Hirohito to surrender and avoid
a costly Allied invasion of the Japan
home islands. In his well-researched
Hell to Pay (first published in 2009,
but newly updated and expanded
in October 2017), D. M. Giangreco
weighs in on the traditional side of the
debate, arguing that Truman based his
decision on reasonable casualty estimations and sound military planning.
Two schools of thought have framed
the debate. Traditionalists maintain that
Truman’s claims were justified, while
revisionists argue that use of atomic
force was unnecessary because Japan’s
sea, land, and air forces were largely
destroyed and Soviet entry into the war
against Japan tipped the scales toward
inevitable defeat. Giangreco, however,
disagrees with revisionist historians
such as Bernard Bernstein who contend
that Truman exaggerated casualty
projections. Giangreco provides readers
with a rich stream of lesser-known
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dates, facts, and figures, including with
regard to troop movements, Selective
Service needs, and medical supplies.
Both the United States and Japan
scrambled to organize land, sea, and air
resources, drawing inexorably toward
a hellish, last-ditch fight to the finish.
Hell to Pay’s seventeen chapters flow
chronologically from 1944 through
the end of the war in 1945, then
continue with events up to 1947. In this
revised edition, Giangreco adds two
new chapters (chapter 11, “To Break
Japan’s Spine,” and chapter 17, “The
Hokkaido Myth”) and an appendix
that provide facts pertinent to the
Soviet entry into the war. In addition
to these new chapters, several others
stand out as especially noteworthy.
In chapter 2, “Spinning the Casualty
Numbers,” Giangreco gives details on
how U.S. military leaders calculated
total casualty numbers and how, when,
and why they chose to publish them.
The U.S. government wanted public
support for Selective Service, but also
did not want to reveal its deployment
plans to the enemy. Although many
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strategists argued at the time that the
number of replacements needed that
U.S. leaders published was inflated, the
author argues that strategists actually
intentionally underinflated the numbers,
using mostly conservative estimates. U.S.
troops, for example, were familiar with
repeated announcements that at least
five hundred thousand replacements
were needed to continue the war in
Japan, whereas on March 9, 1945, Yank
magazine published figures for U.S.
losses from the beginning of World War
II through February 7, 1945, of “782,180,
including 693,342 for the Army alone”
(p. 20). In addition to exploring the various methods of estimation, Giangreco
gives evidence that Truman based his
decision to avoid invasion on conservative, not inflated, casualty estimates.
In his fifth chapter, “Not the Recipe for
Victory,” Giangreco documents U.S. and
Japanese reallocations of troops among
various areas of operation. Despite Allied attempts to deceive the enemy with
misleading communications campaigns,
Japanese military leaders correctly
anticipated the time and location for
the planned initial Allied invasion of
Japan’s home islands: October 1945
in Kyushu, southern Japan. Accordingly, the Japanese transferred thirteen
divisions to Kyushu before the end of
the war in August, whereas General
Douglas MacArthur and U.S. planners
expected only six to ten Japanese
divisions. MacArthur anticipated
outnumbering Japanese troops by a
comfortable margin, but the thirteen
divisions transferred made the probable
ratio closer to 1 : 1. Giangreco emphasizes that, since “planned superiority”
was no longer likely, Truman’s assertion
that five hundred thousand lives would
be lost probably was too conservative.
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One of the most significant chapters in
the book is chapter 6, “The Decision,”
referring to Truman’s decision to drop
the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Giangreco traces factors from the summer of 1944 to August 1945 that affected
the decision, including the casualty
surge from the earlier ratio of more than
4.5 Japanese casualties to every U.S. casualty to a more even ratio of 2 : 1 or even
1.2 : 1 in recent campaigns, such as Iwo
Jima. This surge was one of Truman’s
considerations when he requested that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide
a projection of casualties that would
result from an invasion of Kyushu.
The aforementioned new chapters 11
and 17 contribute facts and research
regarding Soviet entry and participation. Giangreco provides evidence
that MacArthur and other military
advisers supported Soviet entry into
the war against Japan soon after Pearl
Harbor. Accordingly, the author reasons
that Truman did not drop the bombs
to minimize Soviet participation;
contrary to such a narrative, U.S.-Soviet
cooperation in defeating Japan was an
extension of Lend-Lease arrangements
and planning. Although Giangreco
argues that it always had been the intent
of the JCS to incorporate the Soviets
into U.S. war-termination plans in the
Pacific, his research aligns in at least
one instance with revisionists who
argue that Truman wanted to minimize
Soviet participation as much as possible:
while MacArthur always argued for
Soviet entry as the best plan, other JCS
advisers, such as Admiral Ernest J. King,
told Truman that the United States
could defeat Japan without Stalin’s help.
Contemplation of the locations, participants, and numbers involved in this
story can be daunting, but a dedicated
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reader gains a nuanced mental picture
of the moving parts on both sides of
the conflict. Scholars and researchers
who desire in-depth information will
benefit from Giangreco’s research,
and the appendices and bibliography
include numerous primary sources that
have received little or no attention in
past traditionalist-versus-revisionist
debates. This work is a must-read for
those interested in U.S. and Japanese
military and political historiography and
strategy in the final year of World War
II and the critical factors contributing
to war termination in the Pacific.
GINA GRANADOS PALMER

Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy,
American Empire, and the Transformation of
U.S. Naval Identity, 1873–1898, by Scott Mobley.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. 432
pages. $34.95.

Judging Scott Mobley’s Progressives in
Navy Blue by its cover, it might seem
a bit esoteric. The parallels with the
modern U.S. Navy, however, quickly
become apparent in this well-written
and -researched history of the transition
of our Navy from sail to steam and from
constabulary force to national fleet. This
is Mobley’s first book, but in a thirtyyear career as a nuclear-trained surface
warfare officer, including command of
two ships, he lived the same “warriorengineer” dichotomy that was central to
the late-nineteenth-century American
naval culture around which this book
revolves. The U.S. Navy between the
Civil and Spanish-American Wars
engenders limited historical discourse
owing to the lack of naval combat, but
Mobley asserts that the progressive
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currents that the naval officer corps
debated during this period marked a
pivotal shift in ideas on naval professionalism and strategic thinking.
The Gilded Age Navy, in relation to
its time, was not an anachronistic
organization wedded to outdated ideas,
as it often is portrayed. Indeed, in many
ways, the Navy of the 1870s and 1880s
preceded the national Progressive
movement. Even as the Navy addressed
the massive challenges involved in
incorporating emerging technology
into an organization steeped in tradition, the service simultaneously had
to deal with the emergence of national
strategic thought. The idea that America
should maintain a navy for war during
peacetime ran counter to a century
of tradition. Mobley asserts that this
change in strategic focus drove the
cultural shift in the Navy officer corps.
In this he challenges previous scholars
“who attribute the Navy’s revival to
a mix of commercial expansionism,
hegemonic aspirations, and imperial ambition” (p. 12). Progressives in Navy Blue
adds to the scholarship by considering
the “influence of strategic ideas, beliefs,
values, and practices upon the Navy’s
professional culture and identity” (p. 14).
With the marked exception of the Civil
War, within the service’s first century
“decades of overseas service, policing,
and promoting America’s maritime
empire fundamentally shaped the U.S.
Navy as a constabulary force led by
mariner-warriors” (p. 37). The post–
Civil War American navy emphasized
single-ship operations, with limited to
no opportunity for multiship training.
Naval officers and civilian leaders
saw no need to dedicate resources to
homeland defense, believing that the
frigate-and-coastal-fort system in place

3

8/6/18 8:49 AM

